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Jill.1A.RKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA) 
at the 
15TH ANNUAL SILVER Q.UILL DINNER 
SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C. 
Thursday, January 27, 1906 
It is a high honor to be awarded the Silver Q.uill, and, especially, 
to share the award with Everett McKinley Dirksen. The Senator from Illinois 
is not only an esteemed friend of many years standing, he is also properly 
identified as Mr. Republican Party in the Senate, or Mr. Republican in the 
nation, or Mr. Minority Leader of the Senate. 
It is in the latter role that I most frequently meet with Senator 
Dirksen. In these times of 14(b), I encounter his awesome presence not 
only during my waking hours on the Senate floor but also in an occasional 
nightmare. 
Now we meet again this evening. We meet not as adversaries but 
as joint participants in these brief but highly literate proceedings. In 
anticipation of the occasion, I sought to find some explanation in lexicog-
raphy for the phenomenon known as Everett McKinley Dirksen, Senate Minority 
Leader. In the dictionary, listed under "leader," along with more customary 
definitions, there is also one which reads: "--leader--something for guiding 
fish into a trap." This definition obviously does not apply to me, since I 
do not fish. It would, perhaps, be too obvious in the light of 14-B to state 
that it might apply to the Republican leader. 
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Searching further, one finds under "majority" the definition "a 
group having a sufficient number of votes necessary for control." That 
does not appear to apply to the group in the Senate which calls me leader, 
in any event, not within the framework of the current extended debate on 
14(b). Again, it is, perhaps, too obvious to state that it is more apt as 
a description of the group headed by the Republican leader since he has no 
control-problem in extending the debate. 
So when the two definitions are combined and put where they 
obviously belong, after the name of the distinguished Minority Leader, 
we find that Everett McKinley Dirksen may be defined as: "a phenomenal 
leader certainly having a sufficient number of votes to guide the fish of 
the Senate into his trap ." 
I must say that this definition of Senator Dirksen, accurate 
as it is in the light of the current proceedings on 14-b, is not fully 
satisfying. It is not complete. It says nothing of his immense service 
over many decades to party, state, and nation. It says nothing of the 
impassioned and compelling debate he has contributed time and again to 
Senate deliberations. It says nothing of the leadership he has provided, 
time and again, in international and domestic affairs. When the chips of 
patriotism are down, his have invariably been placed, before all else, 
on the high interests of the nation . It was so when Dwight D. Eisenhower 
was President. It was so when John Fitzgerald Kennedy was President. It 
is so with Lyndon B. Johnson, as President. 
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The role of Everett Dirksen was, for example, decisive--and the 
word is used advisedly--in the passage of the historic Civil Rights Acts 
of l964 and l965. His contribution, too, was great to the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty. Time and again, he has lent his vitality, his voice, his vote, to 
a legislative cause which, regardless of party or personal popularity, he 
deems, with deep conviction, to be vital to the nation in its domestic 
tranquility, its international relations or its fundamental validity. 
Everett Dirksen and I have differed many times over the years. 
Our votes on the major controversial issues, more frequently than not, 
show up on opposite sides of the tallies of the Senate. Yet, as Majority 
Leader, I have no hesitancy whatsoever in stating that the record of the 
88th Congress and the first session of the 89th owe an immense debt to the 
contribution of the distinguished Minority Leader. His has been a wise, 
cooperative and understanding participation in~e work of the Senate. As 
majority leader through these years I acknowledge freely that I have been 
aided, although not necessarily abetted, by a great Republican leader who 
is, even more, a great Senator and a great American. 
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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Given before The Irish Fellowship Club 
At the Sheraton Chicago Hotel 
Chicago, Illinois 
Wednesday, March 17, 1965, 7:00p.m., C.S.T. 
I am here, tonight, at the invitation of an old friend, Leo 
Crowley, and I am delighted to be in Chicago for this occasion. It 
affords me an opportunity not only to join with you in the celebration 
of St. Patrick's Day but also to engage in some lobbying for Montana. 
It is a great state for touring and the best way to see it is by train. 
In fact, I have been urging Leo Crowley, for many months, to restore 
the Milwaukee passenger service in Montana. For months, he has been 
shaking his head negatively in response. 
I have talked to him about human need and convenience. He has 
been very sympathetic. Then he has shown me cost figures and balance sheets . 
I have said to him many times: "Leo, people will still ride on 
trains in Montana." He has said to me many times: "Mike, nobody rides on 
trains anymore, any place." 
The stand-off has continued until now. It would be my hope that 
tonight might provide a break-through. I want to note that I had to refuse 
a speaking engagement with the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick in Butte. Why7 
Because the Milwaukee doesn't go there anymore. I accepted, instead, Leo 
Crowley's invitation to come to Chicago. 
I took the B ~ 0 out of Washington. 
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I thought, on the basis of what Leo Crowley had said, that I 
would be the only passenger. 
The train was full. 
So I want to say to Leo Crowley, tonight, if the B ~ 0 can, why 
can't the Milwaukee? 
I shall not press for an immediate answer. It would be unfair to 
bind a good and long-time friend on the basis of the spirit or spirits of 
St. Patrick's Day. 
May I say, further, that I do recognize--sometimes reluctantly--
the inevitability of change. It is taking place not only in railroading but 
in every aspect of our life. We live in an era of vast change. We see it 
in our communities. We see it in our businesses. We see it in science and 
technology. We see it in our government and in the politics which underlies 
it. Not so long ago, if a man attended a St. Patrick's Day celebration it 
was safe to assume that he was not only a son of St. Patrick but a Catholic, 
poor, and a Democrat. Obviously, on the basis of the guest list tonight 
and the magnificence of this dinner, that assumption is no longer safe on 
any count. I should add, perhaps, that I still qualify on all counts. 
Where change is greatest in our lives but where we do not see it 
or sense it so readily is in the world beyond our borders. It is to that 
world and our relations with it that I would address your attention for a 
few moments. 
I do not think it inappropriate to introduce a serious note on 
a day usually given to conviviality. It ought not to be forgotten that the 
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the Saint--who is honored here, tonight, walked in a world which was 
neither pleasant nor carefree. Rather, it was a deeply troubled age in 
which the rock which had been Rome had crumbled. It, too, was a time of 
change . It was a time of chaos, born of ignorance and arrogance, of 
superstition and suffering. It was a time when an isolated and bucolic 
Ireland was at last being stirred into upheaval by a birth in a stable 
many miles and three or four centuries away . 
And, tonight, I would remind you that St . Patrick's Day comes, 
not only to Chicago and the United States but to Saigon, Viet Nam and 
throughout a troubled Southeast Asia. In that distant region, halfway 
around the world from this city, there are those who will also celebrate 
this day. But the green they will wear will be the camoflauge green of 
jungle warfare . In that region, too, there is the chaos born of ignorance 
and arrogance and of superstition and suffering. There is upheaval and 
change--immediate and incipient, in Viet Nam and throughout Southeast Asia . 
A region of immense size is involved. It is a region larger than the United 
States and composed of as many human beings as live in our country plus 
many millions more . 
There, too, the rocks of stability have crumbled in these years 
of our times . The peace of the rice-fields and the quiet of the jungle 
have been shattered. A culture of many cultures, a politics of many 
politics, a people of many peoples have been caught up in the fury of a 
vast upheaval . This upheaval is not necessarily what many of the inhabitants 
may have sought . But whether sought or not, they are engulfed by it and 
they must live with it and work out their own destinies within its dimensions. 
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Into this vast change in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia, our own 
nation has been projected. It is a recent 1nvolvement which, for a long 
time, was scarcely perceptible. Indeed, it is difficult to grasp tne 
rapidity and the extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia without having 
had some firsthand experience with it from the onset. When I first visited 
Southeast As1a a dozen years ago, I nad to check a map to be certain of the 
capital cities of the more remote nations. And the maps often did not 
agree, so little 1nterest was there in tnat part of the world at the time. 
When I visited Laos in 1953, I found two Americans--two Americans--in the 
entire country and both on official assignment. When I visited Saigon in 
that same year, there were scarcely 100 Americans in all of V1et Nam, 
including the North. 
Now, a dozen years later, the number of Americans 1n Viet Nam--
in South Viet Nam alone--is in the vicinity of 30,000 and, according to the 
latest reports, there are, even now, requests from Saigon for the assignment 
of additional United States Army troops. The need for American personnel 
in order to prevent a collapse in South Viet Nam has increased steadily 
in the past four years. It has increased drastically since the unfortunate 
and distressing assassimtion of the one Vietnamese leader who had managed 
to maintain a measure of stability in South Viet Nam--the late President 
Ngo Dinh Diem. In place of his steady hand, there has bean a succession of 
hands produced by coup-on-coup in Saigon. 
Many of us who have witnessed this growing involvement over the 
years have been deeply concerned by it. That is no secret. I, personally, 
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have expressed that concern many times in the past. Yet the fact remains 
that three Presidents in succession--Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson have 
found no satisfactory and persuasive alternative to it. And so far as I 
can see, the prospects now are that the American involvement in Viet Nam 
will deepen further before it lightens. 
Let me say, in all frankness, that I do not know when and on what 
terms the conflict in Viet Nam will end. I can tell you that the President 
has no intention of permitting it to end in a sudden and abject withdrawal 
of American forces. But I am persuaded, too, that it will end at some 
time as all conflicts eventually end, at a conference table. It is signifi-
cant that such public opinion polls as have been taken reflect the same view. 
A vast majority of the American people express support, both, for the 
military measures which the President must take and the hope for an end of 
this conflict. 
In short, the American attitude, insofar as it is reflected in 
these indicators, was formulated originally by the late President John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy. He expressed in it--as he knew so well how to express--
the dual sentiment which resides in the heart of America. We will do, as 
Americans, whatever needs to be done to insure justice and the national 
tranquility. But we will not glorify war as an end in itself. In VietNam, 
we do not desire the sacrifice of a single life beyond what may be necessary 
to bring about an equitable solution. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 2, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 6 -
There are those who say "let us withdraw" which we will 
not and those who say "let's get it over now" which is not a 
prescription for victory. It is an invitation to an extended war 
which will take us on a road that leads ever deeper into Asia. It 
may come to that in the end, no matter how we may seek to prevent it, 
no matter what forebearance and restraint we may practice. That, no 
man can foretell. But I can tell you that the President of the United 
States who bears the terrible responsibility of decision, whose finger 
is on ihe nuclear trigger, has not harkened to the siren call of easy 
victory in Asia, or anywhere else. In this respect, President Johnson 
carries the same burdens as his predecessors, the late John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy and Dwight D. Eisenhower. And all of them have recognized, 
under the weight of these burdens, the necessity for prudence and 
restraint. 
There are no quick or easy answers to the difficulties in 
Southeast Asia. But there are solutions--just solutions--if all 
concerned face the realities of the situation in Viet Nam. And the 
sooner all concerned recognize these realities and are prepared to 
begin an earnest search for these solutigns, the better. The natural 
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jungles of Viet Nam are extensive enough without adding to them the 
manmade wastelands of war. The lot of the people of Viet Nam--north 
and south--is bitter enough without the acrid additions of a spreading 
and deepening conflict. 
The President has no choice but to continue on the course now 
being followed unless those who have engaged us are prepared to face 
these realities. And from the point of view of our own national 
interests, it is essential that we consider what it is that has prompted 
us to make and to continue to make the sacrifices of life and resources 
which we have borne in Viet Nam. I would point out to you, that current 
estimates place that cost at two millions a day, not to speak of the 
priceless lives which have been spent and will be spent. These costs 
are not declining; they are rising. I would point out to you, further, 
that by far the largest single expenditure of foreign aid goes to Viet 
Nam. 
I do not want these sacrifices and, particularly, the 
sacrifices of lives to go on one day longer than necessary. I know 
that you do not want that either and I am certain that the President 
does not. 
But neither do we wish--any of us--to abandon, half down the 
road, a burden which was lifted in the interests of freedom and in our 
own security. 
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That is the only context in which a just peace can be sought 
in Viet Nam. And it is in that context that I ask you, tonight, to 
consider the principles of our national interests in that remote region 
and with the vast changes which have occurred in Asia and in the world 
during our lifetime. 
As a first principle, I would suggest that we seek no colonies, 
or bases or any other permanent American establishment in Viet Nam or 
on the Southeast Asian mainland; and what we do not seek for ourselves 
we will oppose for any other outside power. 
Second, I would suggest that we seek, not to dominate, but 
to live in an equitable peace and in a peaceful commerce and communion 
with all the people of Southeast Asia; and what we seek for ourselves 
we recognize as the right of others to seek for themselves. 
And, third, I would suggest that we are prepared for an end 
to the use of force throughout Viet Nam at the earliest date consistent 
with the right of the peoples of that region to determine their society 
for themselves, free from the terror and aggression which has plagued 
them for too many years. What we are prepared to forego, we insist 
that others must also be prepared to forego. 
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So far as I can see, that is all we seek in Viet Nam a nd South-
east Asia and that is all we should seek in good conscience and in good 
sense in that remote situation. 
I wish I could tell you that Viet Nam is all that need intrude 
in the way of international concern on this pleasant gathering tonight. 
But I cannot, in all honesty, omit reference to the changes which are 
occurring in Africa and, notably, in the Congo. There, too, in remote and 
little known places, a new era is emerging from beneath the crumbled 
stability which heretofore was imposed from without. The colonies are gone 
or almost gone. In their wake has appeared a churning mixture of 
nationalism, tribalism, racialism, democracy, Communism, Islamism, and 
Christianity. And the whole is heated with the immense and oppressive 
poverty of the millions of people who inhabit the continent. 
Here, the American involvement is, as it once was in Indochina, 
minimal, and scarcely perceptible. Here, too, there are those, including 
myself, who have expressed a concern over the years that the involvement 
in Africa might deepen beyond what was necessary and appropriate. Here, too, 
as it is on the Asian mainland, the American interest is limited. Here, too, 
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it can be nothing more than support of African freedom in stability and of 
peaceful commerce and communion with the peoples of Africa. 
There was hope, not so long ago, that the United Nations would 
provide an avenue through the quicksands of African change into an era of 
peaceful relations. There was a hope, not so long ago that the United Nations 
would provide a buffer to insulate the emergent nations from the clashing 
interests of outside powers. But that hope foundered in what transpired in 
the Congo. And it has been assailed, again, by the organizational disarray 
and the financial difficulties of the United Nations. So I would say to you, 
tonight, that unless there is a rebirth of capacity in the United Nations 
to deal with these matters, the United States, along with other nations, 
is likely to be plunged more deeply and more directly into the affairs of 
the African continent. The world may well face in Africa in the near future 
what it now sees in the critical confrontation in VietNam and Southeast Asia. 
The situation which exists elsewhere in the world is neither as 
grim as that in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia nor as ominous as that of the 
Congo and Africa. The danger signs remain in the Middle Fast, to be sure. 
The division of Berlin and Germany and the division of Korea are reminders of 
the unfinished business of past wars which at any time may demand final 
resolution. 
But, there is another side of the coin. In Latin America, for 
example, the Cuban experience--shattering as it was--has not been repeated 
elsewhere. The Alliance for Progress which was set in motion by the late 
President Kennedy has been continued with vigor under President Johnson. 
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It has been, by all reports, most effective and most helpful in assisting 
the Republics to the south to strengthen their stability and to accelerate 
their progress. Some of the Latin American nations, notably Mexico, have 
scored enormous economic advances. And as this progress has become manifest, 
our commercial and other relations with that nation have benefitted greatly. 
In Western Europe, there has been a sustained stability and 
economic advance. On the other side of the continent, the eastern Europeans 
are obviously exerting a greater degree of independence than at any time 
in recent memory. 
These changes for the better are of immense importance to all of 
us. Western Europe is no longer as it was, scarcely 15 years ago, totally 
dependent on us for its survival in freedom. Eastern Europe is no longer 
automatically responsive to the call of Soviet ca:m:nand. Indeed, even Albania, 
not to mention Yugoslavia, is capable of ignoring that call and others, if 
they cannot yet say "no", can at least say, "yes, but •••. " 
For us, these changes infer the need for continuous adjustment in 
our policies within the basic design of our relations with Europe. I am 
hopeful that we will retain a close communication with Western Europe and, 
to that end, do whatever can be done to close the unfortunate breech in 
warmth and understanding which has opened with France. At the same time, I 
would also hope that we might continue to lighten the burden of expense for 
the defense of Western Europe which we have borne in a somewhat one-sided 
arrangement since the end of the war. And the same would apply in the matter of 
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foreign aid, at a time when Europe is generally in a good position to share 
these costs in a more equitable fashion. 
And I would suggest, finally, that if we are to make the adjust-
ments which are necessary in this era of change that we abandon, at last, 
the cliches of isolationism or internationalism. Neither can meet the needs 
of the nation in these critical times. There is no turning back the clock. 
But neither is there any virtue in keeping the hands of the clock ahead of 
the actual time. 
It is not isolationism or internationalism to consider the principles 
of a just peace in Viet Nam even as we pursue the bitter conflict in which 
we have become involved and with which we must stay until that peace is 
achieved. It is connnon sense and sound national and international interest. 
It is neither isolationism nor internationalism to consider other 
means--through a restored and reorganized and financially stable United 
Nations, if that is possible--to avoid a series of Viet Nams in Africa. It 
is connnon sense and sound national and international interest. 
It is not isolationism nor internationalism to consider ways of 
diffusing the burdens of responsibility and costs which we still carry, 
largly in a one-sided fashion for the defense of the West and for foreign 
aid at a time when we are in balance-of-payments difficulties and Europe 
has a greater capacity than heretofore. It is common sense and sound national 
and international interest. 
These, then, are the thoughts which I would leave with you tonight. 
And I would ask you for patience and trust of the President, whose burdens are 
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great as are those of any President. I would ask you to think through 
these immensely difficult questions of foreign relations so that you will 
understand what it is that confronts him. I would ask you, even when you 
differ with him, to appreciate that he is acting, as God gives him the 
capacity, in the interests of the people of the nation and for the peace 
and security of all of us. 
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It has 
former 
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. MONT) 
1966 DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL DINNER 
THE ARMORY, MAY 12 , 1966 
7:00 p. m. 
Washington, D. c. 
On behalf of the Democratic Senators standing for reelection 
- all of whom will be reelected - in November, I thank you. 
I thank you, too, on behalf of the new Democrats who will 
be in the Senate next January. 
Finally, I express the appreciation of all Senate Democrats 
to the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee - to Chairman Magnuson, 
Vice Chairman Dan Inouye, and to their colleagues and to their fine 
staff headed by Mattie Matthews and Fred Lordan. The Committee has made 
a great contribution, tonight, as it always does whenever an opportunity 
presents itself in any way, shape, or form to help Democratic Senatorial 
candidates. 
There ~ be better ways than over-priced dinners to finance 
political campaigns. Same day they will be devised and put into prac-
tice. Until they are, however, these dinners are under-priced at any 
price, because they are essential to the political life of the nation. 
It remains a fact that a little steak goes a long way. And 
tonight it goes a very long way. 
It goes towards continuing the high caliber of the recent 
Congresses into the next Congress. 
It goes towards assuring President Lyndon B. Johnson of the 
great legislative cooperation that he has had into the next two years. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 2, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
I • 
-2-
Tonight, we can look forward to another Democratic Congress 
in January. Even greater Democratic majorities in the 90th Congress 
are within sight. 
Certainly there are no signs now visible in the nation's 
economy which point to the defeat of Democratic Congressional candidates 
in November. There are many indications in the nation's economy which 
point to the election of additional Democrats. 
There are no issues in the President's programs of civic 
advance which point to the defeat of Democratic candidates. There are 
already many achievements under those programs which redound to the 
credit of the Democratic party. You know the list. Medicare, civil 
rights, educational aid, anti-poverty, air and water pollution control, 
social security increases, GI benefits, and a dozen others designed for 
the welfare of the nation's people. And before this session is out, 
the list will be larger. 
In short, the ...... _.._._. effectiveness with which recent 
Democratic Congresses have met their legislative responsibilities for 
the social welfare of the nation recommends to the people the addition, 
not the subtraction, of democrats from the next Congress. 
Where, then, are the clouds on the horizon? What, then, are 
the concerns of Democrats for next November? Let us be blunt. WhatJ
1 0
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about Viet Namr It is there. With the best of bi-partisan intentions 
- and some are not the best - it is not going to be kept out of sight 
during the months ahead. With the best of bi-partisan intentions - and 
same are not the best - it is not going to be swept under a political 
rug during the next few months. 
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The truth is that Viet Nam is the question of fundamental 
concern to the people of the United States. And any question which 
concerns the people deeply; concerns every Democratic candidate for 
Congress. The issue must be faced and met in the coming campaign. 
What I want to say to you tonight is that Democrats need have 
no fear of this issue. Democrats in this Congress have no apologies 
whatsoever to make on the question of Viet Nam. Democrats, however, do 
owe the people of the United States an open discussion of this question 
in the coming months. And so, too, may I say, do Republican candidates. 
The public is entitled to know what a Democratic Congress thinks about 
Viet Nam. The public is entitled to know in what way a Republican 
Congress would think differently and what it would be likely to do 
differently. 
There will certainly be discussion of Viet Nam in the coming 
campaign. For the good of the nation, beyond party, one can only hope 
that it will be honest and straight-forward discussion. For the good 
of the nation, one can only hope this discussion can be pursued with a 
decent restraint. One can only hope that it will reflect a due regard 
for the great and final responsibilities of the President of the United 
States. 
There are differences of view among Democrats in the Senate 
on Viet Nam. They have been expressed time and again, and they will 
continue to be expressed while the issue remains unresolved, while peace 
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remains disestablished. There also are differences of view among 
Democrats in the Senate on civil rights, poverty, or whatever among 
the programs of the Administration. These differences, too, have been 
expressed. And there have been differences among Democrats on every 
major issue which has confronted the nation in my recollection. And 
these, too, have been expressed. Indeed, some of these differences 
have gone far deeper than those on Viet Nam today and have been expressed 
with greater vehemence. 
Have these differences wrecked the party1 On the contrary, 
in the end, they have strengthened it. Within the framework of this 
party there has been and there is, now, room for diversity on any issue. 
And as we mean to keep this party strong and vital, we will see to it 
that the door is kept open to diversity of view, whether it is on issues 
sectional, ideological, or international. 
I say to you, moreover, that on Viet Nam there is more, far 
more, convergence among Democrats in the Senate than divergence. Bear 
in mind that not a single legislative measure pertaining to Viet Nam 
which the President has sought beginning with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 
has not passed and passed with a great majority. Bear in mind that, 
reciprocally, the President has been receptive to and has tried eagerly 
to pursue many of the suggestions of members of the Senate which offered 
some promise of peace. 
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President Johnson has the sympathy of every Democrat in the 
Senate in his great responsibilities for foreign relations. Whatever 
independent views may be held on Viet Nam, however vehemently they may 
be expressed, Senators know, as you know, and as the American people 
are beginning to find out that we are dealing with the most complex, 
::.. f>v- cJ_,. ~-
baffling, and uncertain situation ever to confront~the United States . 
a.Jm'IQ. They know, as the President knows, and as you know, and as 
the American people are beginning to find out that there are no sure 
('tV' c~ ~ 1 
cures,~no easy exi.ts from the morass. 
The truth is that there are no experts on Viet Nam who can 
show a simple way, either to victory or to a just peace. There are 
only degrees of inexpertness. That is true in the agencies of govern-
ment, no less than in the academic world or in the Congress. The 
President is seeking the best advice and counsel from wherever he can 
get it in his search for solutions. On the basis of that advice, he 
is straining every fiber of mind and heart to set the course which may 
lead to a just and honorable peace in Viet Nam. Every Democrat in the 
Senate knows of the energy of that effort, and every Democrat in the 
Senate fully sympathizes with the President in that effort. 
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We go into the campaign knowing that the President and the 
Democratic members of the Congress each have their individual respon-
sibilities on this issue even as they have a collective responsibility 
to the nation. In that light, we go into this campaign--all Democrats--
with the conviction that another great Democratic Congress working with 
th~~leadership of President Lyndon B. Johnson is the best hope, 
not only for a just and satisfying society at home but for the achievement 
of a reasonable and honorable peace in Viet Nam at the soonest possible 
time. 
~ 
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VIET N.AM AND CHINA 
THE SHADOW OF WAR--THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE 
I welcome the opportunity to share this day with the Class of 
1966. For the most part, you are among the last to have been born during 
'i-J'orld War II. Hence, you are among the first to have received the pledge 
of peace of the United Nations in 1945. The preamble to the Charter, you 
will recall, contains this solemn statement of purpose: "To save succeed-
ing generations from the scourge of war." 
The pledge has stood for twenty-one years. Commencement 
addresses this year might well ponder the adequacy of its fulfillment. 
It is a fitting theme for graduating classes, not only in the United 
States, but in the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain, and elsewhere. 
The Class of 1966 has been witness, since birth, not to a grow-
ing peace in the world, but to a procession of crises and conflicts. 
This class has come to maturity in an atmosphere which for two decades 
has been heavy with war and the threat of war. This class graduates 
directly into the face of the bitter war in Viet Nam. 
Yet the words remain: "To save succeeding generations from the 
~eonrge of war." 
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The detonation of the first atomic bomb gave to these words a 
great fervor in 1945. The pledge is even more compelling two decades 
later. Today, nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, are 
stocked in the arsenals not only of the United States, but of the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, France and, perhaps now, China. 
At this moment in time, peace is more than an ideal and a hope. 
It is a universal and urgent human necessity. 
The problem of peace is the great preoccupation of the President 
and of the Senate. It is a problem, unfortunately, which grows more, not 
less, difficult with each passing day. Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam, 
we have scarcely begun to delineate the path to peace. We have yet, after 
extraordinary efforts, to begin to devise a formula for the resolution of 
the conflict. 
During the past year, the effort has been made to end the war 
by waging more war and it has not succeeded. For a time, the effort was 
made to end the war by waging less war and that, too, did not succeed. 
The President has pursued negotiations in public. He has searched for 
them in private. He has sought a conference on peace on every highway 
and by-way of international diplomacy. 
But peace remains elusive. The end of the war in Viet Nam is 
not in sight. The question of Viet Nam continues to command our most 
persevering thought. It continues to demand a most honest, restrained 
and thorough public discussion. 
We owe an unremitting search for a peaceful solution in Viet 
Nam to the young Americans who have gone and who will go to that tortured 
land. We owe it to the Vietnamese people who have suffered from the war 
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in great multitudes and beyond imagining. We owe it to our individual 
consciences and to the collective conscience of the nation. 
Therefore, I address your attention, today, to the problem of 
peace in Viet Nam. I ask you to consider this problem in the context of 
the limbo in which, for more than a decade and a half, have reposed the 
relations between China and the United States. The two questions--peace 
in Viet Nam and peace with China--are very closely interrelated, if not, 
indeed, inseparable. 
In a direct military sense, it is true that China is not presently 
involved in Viet Nam. We have, in fact, bent every effort to assure the 
Chinese that we mean them no harm and that we have no desire to share this 
conflict in Viet Nam with them. We have, in short, sought to avoid military 
engagement with China and, except in accident, so far have avoided it. 
Nevertheless, China is involved in Viet Nam. Chinese participa-
tion is largely indirect, but it is nevertheless a real participation. It 
takes the form of encouragement of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front 
in the south. It includes the supply of war materials which are used 
against Americans and other supporting assistance. 
There is also already an element of direct Chinese participation 
in Viet Nam. Large Chinese labor battalions are at work along the overland 
routes which come into North Viet Nam from China. Americans have been shot 
at and shot down by China, as the war in the air over North Viet Nam has 
skirted the Chinese borders. That is the sort of involvement which already 
prevails. There is every probability, moreover, that the longer the war 
goes on, the greater will become the extent of Chinese participation. As 
time goes on, an escalating war tends to take on its own relentlessness. 
One-by-one the hatches of avoidance shut down for all concerned. 
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If the Chinese are linked ever more tightly to the continuance 
of the war in Viet Nam, it seems to me that they are also tied inextricably 
to the question of peace in that nation and in Asia as a whole. I shall 
consider those matters, however, later in my remarks. Let me turn, first, 
to the inner problems of Viet Nam. 
Events of the past few weeks lend to the war an air of bewilder-
ing ambiguity. It is not surprising that they engender a great deal of 
confusion and uncertainty in this nation. 
We are engaged in war against the North Vietnemese, the Viet 
Cong, and the National Liberation Front of the south. But the elements 
of leadership in South Viet Nam who have the greatest stake in that effort 
are engaged in a quasi-war amongst themselves. This inner conflict has 
produced pressures for instability in the south which have little to do 
with the war in which we are engaged~ In the light of these pressures, 
it is unrealistic to describe the situation in South Viet Nam in a clear-
cut ideological context. It has never been, in fact, that kind of simple 
situation. 
To view the conflict as wholly one of an aggression of the north 
against the south also does not do adequate justice to the perplexing 
realities of Viet Nam. The war is more than a clash between two nations 
or hostile strangers. It is also a rending of long associated cultures, 
north, central and south, which contain relatives, friends and enemies 
for whom the 17th parallel is a division of dubious significance and 
durability. 
It is illustrative, in this connection, to note that the leader 
of North Viet Nam, Ho Chi Minh, was born much farther south in Viet Nam 
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than the present leader of South Viet Nam, General Nguyen Cao Ky. Ho Chi 
Minh, the communist, was educated extensively in what is now anti-communist 
South Viet Nam, while Nguyen Cao Ky, the anti-communist, received his train-
ing in what is now communist North Viet Nam. And if that leaves you con-
fused, think for a moment what it must do to the Vietnamese people who must 
live with the confusion. 
What I am suggesting by this digression is that while Viet Nam 
may be two Houses in conflict, it is at the same time one House not only 
divided, but also united in many ways. What I am suggesting, too, is that 
events of the past few weeks represent the surfacing of but a few of the 
complex difficulties of the Vietnamese situation. 
It seems to me that these difficulties have grown more intractable 
and the solutions more difficult since the tragic assassination of President 
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Coup has followed coup until the count has been lost. 
In the process, the leadership of South Viet Nam has been sundered and 
weakened, the rivalries have grown, the mutual antipathies have increased. 
And, in the process, the Vietnamese people have suffered greatly in conse-
quence of these developments as well as from the war. 
In all frankness, so, too, has this nation suffered from these 
developments. The instability amongst the South Vietnamese leaders has 
meant a steady increase in our involvement in Viet Nam, and especially 
our military role. There is no question that the Armed Services of the 
United States have provided a growing margin of power without which a 
Republic of Viet Nam could not have survived. To them has fallen the 
task of filling the defensive gap left by the growing strains on the 
South Vietnamese authorities. On them has fallen the principal burden 
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of meeting t~e increased military pressures from the no~th. These tasks 
which have been assigned to them by the nation's policies have been dis-
charged with great dedication and at great person~ sacrifice . 
The inc~ease in the American effo~t in Viet Nam has been ani 
will continue to be very costly. During the past year and a half, our 
ground forces commitment has grown from about 25,000 to 267 1 000. By year's 
end, this figure will be much higher. The deployment of American naval 
and air power has been of a very great magnitude. It has brought to bear 
on Viet Nam the impact of tens of thousands of additional highly trained 
~en who have unleashed a level of destructive power which may approach or 
even surpass that which was set loose during the Korean war. 
At the beginning of 1965, the United States fcrces were incurring 
casualties at the rate of about 6 per week. Now, upwards of 500 Americans 
are killed and wounded each week. For the past five or six weeks in 
succession, the casualty rate for Americans has surpassed that of the 
South Vietnamese armed forces. 
In monetary terms, the current cost of Viet Nam to the United 
States has been estimated at an annual rate in the neighborhood of $13 
billion and is continuing to rise. In early 1965, the costs were perhaps 
$1 or $2 billion. 
I wish that I could tell you that this powerful injection of 
American resources had brought the war nearer to a conclusion. But I 
can only repeat what I said at the outset of my remarks: 1 the end of the 
war in Viet Nam is not in sight. 
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It has been suggested of late--perhaps inferred is more accurate--
that the war can be ended quickly by a further expansion of the American 
military effort and, particularly, by more and better-placed bombing. 
That is an appealing suggestion, and I have no doubt that it will be heard 
more frequently between now and November. It wraps up, in one simple 
thought, a criticism of the present political leadership, a promise of a 
less painful war, an expectation of victory at a relatively small increase 
in cost. In short, it suggests that there is an easy exist. Let us under-
score one point, here, today: There are easy ways to plunge more deeply 
into this situation; there are no easy ways out of this situation. 
I have just illustrated the extraordinary expansion of the 
American military effort--including bombing--in the past year and a half. 
Before going further along that path, it would seem to me that we have a 
great responsibility to pause and, first, consider carefully the point to 
which this path has led. I can assure you that the politically responsible 
leadership of the nation in the person of the President is not unmindful 
of this responsibility. There is, indeed, a most profound concern as to 
where this course has led and where it may yet lead. 
~Vhen the sharp increase in the American military effort began 
in early 1965, it was estimated that only about 400 North Vietnamese 
soldiers were among the enemy forces in the south which totalled 140,000 
at that time. Today, the overall size of the enemy in the south has in-
creased to 250,000 of whom at least 301 000--a very conservative estimate--
are considered to be North Vietnamese regulars. One source suggests that 
if local Viet Cong battalions which operate within their own provinces 
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are excluded from the total, the northerners make up approximately one-
half of the disciplined professional enemy soldiers in South Viet Nam and 
may well constitute two-thirds by year's end. 
Shortly after the outset of the expansion of the military effort, 
it was believed that about 1,500 North Vietnamese were crossing the border 
each month. Just a few months ago, the maximum potential infiltration was 
thought to be about 4,500 per month. But infiltration has recently been 
reported in the press to be at a current rate well in excess of this figure. 
The field of battle was confined largely to South Viet Nam when 
the expansion of our military effort began. Air and sea bombardment has 
now extended the arena of conflict throughout almost all of North Viet 
Nam. The war has spread sharply into Laos. More and more, it verges on 
Cambodia and threatens to spill over into Thailand. And as I have already 
mentioned, American planes have been shot at and shot down on or across 
the borders of China. 
Whatever constructive achievement has resulted from this expan-
sion, the fact must also be faced that the search for peace by intensifica-
tion of war has begotten, not peace, but a further intensification of war. 
The expansion of the arena of conflict has yielded, not peace, but further 
expansion of the arena of conflict. 
Is the war, then, to continue to intensify? Is Viet Nam--north 
and south--to be reduced to a charnel house amidst smoking, silent ruins? 
Indeed, is that to be the fate of great areas of Southeast Asia and regions 
beJQnd? 
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Experience requires us to recognize that this danger exists in 
the conflict. Prudence compels us to recognize, moreover, that the 
terminal point may not be reached until and unless the war has involved 
China directly. That possibility, it seems to me, should be faced sooner 
rather than later. We should examine it, now, while there is yet time to 
examine it in good sense and soberness. We should examine it, now, rather 
than wait until the actuality is confronted in the heat of some accident, 
miscalculation or misunderstanding or at the end of that long drift which 
ends in inescapable military convergence. 
Certainly, the experience of Korea counsels us to examine this 
question without delay and, in so doing, to lay aside the distorting prism 
of wishful thinking. It will be recalled that a war between Koreans--
north and south--a decade and a half ago, beca~e in the end what few 
expected at the beginning. It became, substantially, a war between the 
United States and China. And you will recall, too, that in the end peace 
was not restored to Korea by victory but by a truce which required the 
agreement of the United States and China. 
The question must be asked here as well as in Peking . It must 
be asked now. Can peace be restored in Southeast Asia, as it was not in 
Northeast Asia, before, rather than after, a military clash? Can there 
be a turning off from the course of collision and onto the road of settle-
ment before, rather than after, the crash? 
I can give you no assurances on these questions. The answers 
depend not only on our wdsdom and restraint but also on that of the 
Chinese. I can only stress to you that the relentless search for affirma-
tive answers is a most solemn responsibility which rests especially upon 
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the leadership of this nation and of China but concerns also the United 
Nations, the Geneva powers, and the entire world. 
There is little doubt that this search is hamoered by the long 
hiatus in United States relations with China. It is a decade and a half 
since the Chinese revolution and the Korean conflict which followed it. 
In all these yea~s, little of consequence was done to close the deep void 
which these shattering events blasted between the peoples of the two nations. 
On the contrary, the seeds of hostility and suspicion were scattered widely 
and in both countries. The weeis of a mutual distrust were encouraged to 
grow high in both countries. The direct human contact between the world's 
most populous nation and the world's most powerful was reduced to formal 
and routine meetings in Warsaw between an American and a Chinese Ambassador 
>vhich, over the years, have averaged out to about one a month . 
In the last few weeks members of the Administration have sought 
to make clear in public statements that this nation seeks to restore some 
"bridges" to China. That is a helpful initiative. It is also useful to 
lower our rigid self-imposed travel and other barriers which the Executive 
Branch is now doing. 
These acts accord with the nation's interest and they are most 
certainly meaningful gestures in the direction of peace. That the Chinese 
greet these efforts with unabated hostility does not change their validity. 
In the present state of Chinese-United States relations, all acts are 
suspect. All doubts are magnified. All fears are exaggerated. These 
acts, nevertheless, remain proper and modest acts which may one day 
redound to the benefit of both nations. That is all they are and they 
ought not to be regarded as anything more. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 74, Folder 2, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- ll -
They d.o not, certainly, go to the core of the current danger 
which lies in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the relevance of these 
acts must necessarily remain dubious, at least until that danger is faced 
and begins to abate. 
~fuat is needed most, at this time and in the light of that danger, 
is an initiative for a direct contact between the Peking government and 
our own government on the problem of peace in V~et Nam and Southeast Asia. 
This problem is of such transcendent importance, it seems to me, that it 
is a fit question for face-to-face discussion between China and the United 
States at the highest practicable level. Our Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, confronted the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, across the 
Conference table at Geneva in 1961-62. It may be that a similar meeting 
now would be useful in this critical situation. 
The meeting could be confined to the two nations, or it could 
include all the belligerents in Viet Nam. It could include the nations 
of the Southeast Asian mainland since they all lie in the swath of the 
war's spreading devastation. It seems to me that there are many possible 
and acceptable alternatives insofar as participation and arrangement are 
concerned. 
The membership and mechanics of the conference are not key issues. 
History will not be gentle with those who purst...~ the shadm• and evade the 
substance of peace . It will not view with sympathy those who stand too 
much on ceremony or who insist too much on face as the price of coming to 
grips with its profound problems . 
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An Asian confer.ence, at this time, cannot draw a distinction 
between victor and vanquished in this conflict, any more than it was 
possible to do so in the Korean settlement. All win by peace; all lose 
by the war 1 s continuance. 
What a conference at this time must be concerned with is, in 
the first instance, a curb on the expansion of the war and a prompt and 
durable termination of the tragic bloodletting in Viet Nam. 
It must be concerned with insuring a choice free of coercion 
of any kind to the people of South Viet Nam over their future and on the 
question of the reunification of Viet Nam. 
It must be concerned with how the independence and the territorial 
integrity, not only of Viet Nam, but of other small nations of Southeast 
Asia can be safeguarded in peace. 
It must be concerned, finally, with how foreign bases and 
foreign military forces can be promptly withdrawn and excluded from 
Viet Nam and other parts of the Southeast Asian mainland. 
These are fundamental questions. Answers to these questions 
must begin to be found. And, in the last analysis, they must be con-
curred in by China and the United States. Those are the essentials if 
the conflict in Viet Nam is to end and if a reasonable and stable peace 
is to be established in Southeast Asia. 
Let me make clear that I am not sanguine as to the possibilities 
that these questions will be faced in conference in the near future. Even 
less is it to be expected that answers to these questions are going to be 
found very quickly. The chasms are deep. The walls are high. 
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Nevertheless, at some point, these questions will have to be 
faced and answers will have to be found. It s eems to me that we must 
continue to t~y to take those first faltering steps toward peace in Asia. 
We must try to take them, now, before the tragedy, which is Viet Nam, is 
compounded many times over. That is the great responsibility. It rests 
on the Chinese. It rests on this nation. It rests, finally, on all the 
nations of the world. 
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PEKING, Junt 24-Com~~­
nist China tod.,Y rejected Sen. 
Mike Mansfield's proposal for 
Chinese-American talka on 
Vietnam at the Foreign Min-
isters' level. 
A foreign Ministry spokes-
man, asked to comment on the 
'Senate Democratic Leader's 
proposal that Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk and Chinese 
Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
meet to discu.ss ways of ending 
the Vietnam confilct, said the 
question arose solely because 
of the U.S. "war of agcression" 
in V i'etnam. 
Tliis aggression has to stop 
and all United States forces 
must be withdrawn from South 
Vietnam, the spokesman said. 
He added that "to say that 
a settlement of the Vietnam 
question can be negotiated be· 
tween the Foreig~M'nisters of 
China and the Un' States 
is entirely an atte pt to cover 
up the present !ted States 
effort to expan its war of 
aggression against Vietnam." 
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unhappy struggl. in Vi t i --the nd f which is not in sight. lie hav 
also Wi tn sa f instability within our own country--a 
combination or conditions and incid nt ich will requir th best 
fforts of o.ll people of good will if the p bli intere t is to prevail. 
Througnout it all, I ha n ver 1 t faith in the peopl of Montana and 
th nation to do at is rif#lt en feJ: with the facts. 
I proud of my State and my country. ile I find fault 
with s~ Co t d i io s, wi s e of our domestic policies, and s e 
aspects of our for ign policy, I try my b st to understand and to support 
th ;v and th polic es or our ver at. And I try, too, to make my 
si on u rstood on e si t re son and logic and not on th basis 
of tio a. I do n t loo at all questions on a black or white basis 
ecause ther of gray in betwe n. 
here are, h h e of gr y in my f lings bout 
ontan • To , it 1 wi out qu tion th best St te in th Union--
State to o~ in, raise families in, a State to hunt and fish in, a 
tate in transition the 0 West to t n , State which in outlook 
nd scope is an ire and a symph ny c bin • 
It i n ire f st ize and tential, of t b ty 
nd ur. It 1 an ir wh rtunit1 and p ssibilities 
dr people fro verywhere 
ings. 
d to live in its g erous surround-
It is s hony ose music is the Missouri, t Y l.lovstone, 
the Musselshell, the F th ad, t Col bi 1 the Big Horn, the Powder, 
e Tongue, and th Kootenai. 
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There io no · in r exwnpl of cono.>tructiv Feder -State 
cooper tio than tb. project for which w ar a ut to br ound. 
The turning of' the earth here o y signals th b ginning of a 
prosperity for northwectern Montana. l-1ha.t 1tre are b nning today can 
o tr n.dous uefi t to ur gr t State if utiliz 
organization. 
th cere and 
Thi ... Corp f Engin era pr jec:t is a tribu to the in nui ty 
oi' iv planning. Libby Dam will rise about 420 feet 
a ve e ock and it ViU 31 055 ee lon at e crest. There will be 
three 10~, kilow: tt · , rators and r m for re. Th dam will creat 
rser 50, t.)()() acr -f t capacity. All o this will cost 
approx·~· llH.lloe:.l.v , 000, the ntire unt of "Which is fully rep ble 
wit od inves ent in e future of Montana, and 
it i n which can b i • 
Th to o Libby D covers span of many years. In fact, 
w hav b e talking about Li by sine my ly days in the IIouse of 
pr sentativ s. On o the lie t s J?parters of i multi-purpose 
pro t w s a H r ognized. in 
Libby D easJ.bl pla of ontrolling flood water in orthw s ern 
on c of power naratio and many 
i'it such alii recr • all rk together on this 
pr ject. In fact, this is one of e very f F eral proj eta of this 
ma.gni tude that h . nerat a. of opposi tio • My able colleagu 
and friend, S nator Lee M tca.l.f, h b en strong ~ource of support 
a •e Congres en A;rnl) Olsen and Jim Battin, all o state officials 
in bringing this proJect to the point ot constru tion. 
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supported by d r ~ Q l~ ?) Jf: fiftyst tea . The pr bl a 
of veryday life are more d odin than at e. y t:t in our hist ry. I:f 
you do not desir th ervices 1' t.he F eral go~rernment wit.lt its reaol•.rces 
and t hnicians, th n the tates 1r cipalitiev must demo str t 
. 
th a bill ty t r lve these prob tisfaction of the majority, 
pr tecting th rights and ne s f the minority. If' this is not done, then 
naer our Conotitution, th er .• has a strict responsibil1 ty 
to act. c bl d the b st of each and th end 
r sult will be a mor prosperou , better educo.t , solve t and onomical.ly 
to t.'l d me u of this last half o:f t e 
20 C nt • 
In c sing, 1 t e r eat y pl a~ e t b 1 g h r "t-Ti th u 
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THE WHITE HOUSE 
WAS HINGTON 
August 10, 1966 
Dear Mike: 
The start of construction of Libby Dam is an 
event of national and international signifi-
cance. 
/ 
/ 
I remember that on many occasions during my 
years in Congress we discussed the desirability 
of this project as a further means of control-
ling and storing water on one of the greatest 
river systems in the world. 
We authorized its construction during those 
days. Its beginning, however, depended upon 
a treaty with Canada for mutual development 
and benefit from the waters of the Columbia 
River and its tributaries. Only when such 
a pact was negotiated could Libby Darn be 
built to its most efficient height, which 
would back water over the border into Canada. 
Consequently, it was with great personal 
pleasure that as President I was able to sign 
the treaty with Prime Minister Pearson at a 
ceremony under the Peace Arch joining our 
two nations. This agreement made possible 
not only Libby Dam, but three storage projects 
in Canada. 
. . 
RO 
• v ~o..- ---
~ 
l<£RO 
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I compliment our good northern neighbors for 
// 
promptly undertaking cons truction of the dams 
on their side of the border . Now the United 
States is movins on schedule to fulfill our 
part of the bargain. 
I am delighted, too, that Congress has author-
ized construction of the Third Powerhouse at 
Coulee Dam. This also is a direct result of ' · 
the treaty. 
Thus, two great nations of the Western Hemis-
phere are working together to develop their 
joint resources. It is in the same spirit of 
peace and cooperation among men of good will 
that I extend best wishes to all who are parti-
cipating in the groundbreaking for Libby Dam. 
Honorable Mike Mansfield 
Majority Leader 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C • 
~ 
~ ~~:;: ~ 1 
, .. ' I
I 
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Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
Johns Hopkins University 
(The George Huntington Williams Memorial Lecture) 
Thursday, November 10, 1966, 4:00p.m. 
VIET NAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
I have come here from two weeks of politics in Montana. Elections 
in my State usually involve a great deal of personal exchange with voters. 
This year was no exception. Although not running myself, I found the cam-
paign as intensive as Montana is extensive. It carried me into confronta-
tion with many, many Americans over a trail of thousands of miles. I had 
occasion to speak t o Montanans on the range, in the high mountains, along 
the roads, at ranch and reservation, and in village, town, and city. 
Political campaigning is not, as it might appear to be, an 
exhausting pursuit. On the contrary, at least to the politically sensitized, 
it is a kind of restorative. It reactiv/ ates the ability to differentiate 
between what is important and what is grossly over-rated in the public 
affairs of the nation. That essential perspective, may I say, is fre-
quently distorted in the political prisms of Washin~toi. 
A campaign may be designed t o inform the voter but it also informs 
the campaigner . It unfolds the deep disquiets as well as the hopes which 
move in the political substructure of the nation. Each election campaign, 
in short, is a rediscovery of the human side of American public life. 
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I meet with you fresh from an exposure to a cross-section of 
American sentiment as it exists in Montana, where the frost has long been 
on the pumpkin and the snows of winter have already begun to gather . I 
meet with you still strongly seized with what lies closest to the heart 
of the people of my State . 
I have found in 25 years of public life that on fundamental 
matters , there is not much difference between a Montanal outlook and the 
national outlook. I assume, therefore, that the basic concerns of the 
people of Montana are your basic concerns, just as basic hopes are also 
probably similar . In short, I assume that what is most important in 
Montana is also likely to be most important here . 
In that vein, I wish that I might say that the legislat ive 
record of the 89th Congress or some specific aspect of it is of funda-
mental interest to Americans at this tine. As you know, t he Senate and 
House dealt with a great range of public problems during the past two 
years. These problems, having accumulated over a long time, had arisen 
to challenge not only the stability of the nation's political and social 
structure but even the adequacy of the nation ' s physical environment . 
In my judgment, a very substantial legislative base has now been 
laid for meeting these problems. The record of the 89th Congress is, 
indeed, extraordinary in scope . The cognomen, "Great Congress" may well 
be apt . In any event, as a participant, I s hould like to think so. 
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Yet, in all honesty, I cannot claim that the legislative achieve-
ments of these two years are a response to what is most basic in the 
concerns and hopes of the people of the nation. I regret to say that 
these achievements, however significant, are obscured in the shadow wtich 
Viet Nam has cast over every aspect of the life of the nation. 
The preoccupation of Americans remains VietNam and its impli-
cations. Every day, these implications grow more personal and direct for 
more youth and their families. The war is clearly the nexus of the national 
anxiety. And peace lies at the heart of the nation's hopes; peace--its 
honorable restora~ion at the earliest possible moment. 
I know that you have heard a great deal of Viet Nam over many 
months. It is a subject from which you might welcome a measure of surcease. 
By the same token, I would prefer to consider some other less vexing 
question, perhaps even the outcome of the election. Yet I am impelled 
to return to this critical matter tonight. 
As you may know, problems of foreign relations have concerned me 
for many years and, out of that concern, I have frequently addressed myself 
to the Vietnamese question. My views on the situation there are generally 
known and I do not intend to repeat them in detail here. Certainly, I have 
said time and again--in public statements as well as in the private councils 
of the government--that it does not matter much, at this late date, how we 
became involved in Viet Nam. The point is that we are involved, deeply involved, 
and we cannot and we will not withdraw in the absence of an honorable settlement 
of this question. Nevertheless, I believe (and I have so stated many times) 
that it would be to the benefit of all concerned if there could be an immediate 
contraction of the hostilities and, as soon as possible thereafter, their 
complete termination. 
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I have l ong been persuaded that the interests of the United States 
categorize us as a Pacific power but that those interests most certainly do 
not commend to us the role of Asian power . As a Pacific power rather than 
an Asian power (and the two are sometimes confused) it is, in my judgment, 
wholly in our national interest to remove American military installations 
and forces from the entire Southeast Asian mainland, as soon as that can 
be done- -as soon as an honorable peace is assured. 
May I say that that view accords with the President's proclaimed 
purpose in VietNam which is a settlement achieved by negotiations. At 
Manila, moreover, the pledge was made that there would be a withdrawal 
of American forces from VietNam within six months after a basis for 
peace is established. He has alluded, also, time and again, to the willingness 
of the United States to remove American bases not only from VietNam but from 
all of the Southeast Asian mainland. 
This policy has not only been enunciated by the President; it has 
been reiterated by his subordinates . His Ambassador at the United Na~ions, 
for example, gave the President ' s policy its most comprehensive expression 
in the flexible proposals for a Vietnamese peace which he made at the 
opening of the current session of the General Assembly . 
It has to be faced, however, that for all the words of peace, there 
is not only an absence of peace but no visible prospect for its restoration 
in the near future . Those with whom we are locked in this deadly struggle 
are either not persuaded of the honesty of our purpose in seeking the negotia-
tion of an honorable peace or they are not interested in an honorable peace or 
they define an honorable peace in concepts so different from our own that, at 
this point, there is no basis for a reconciliation of positions . 
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May I add quickly that I assume that so~e such considerations 
are involved, because there are no certainties as to why proffers of ne otia-
tions have been rejected out of hand . The fact is that in the absence of a 
confrontation between all the participants--the direct and indirect partici-
pants --in this conflict, we cannot understand precisely the reasons for the 
reluctance to open negotiations. Nor can we define the dimensions of the 
gap which must be bridged before peace can be re-established. 
At this time, only one point is clear . Despite the President's 
obvious willingness to confer or to negotiate, we have found no such willing-
ness on the part of North Viet Nam, the Southern National Liberation Front, 
China, or the Soviet Union . \·le have been unable to enter into an exchange 
with any participantSdirect or indirect in the Vietnamese war--except those 
already in substantial sympathy or agreement with us . 
And so, the echo of the words of peace is the continued din of 
war . The conflict in Viet Nam has not only failed to contr ct; it has 
steadily expanded. The process has been relentless . ll the while, the 
options have shrunk; the alternatives have grown fewer . 
It is not yet clear what it will take to produce a flicker in 
the lamp of peace, much less what will be required to end the war. Until 
the conflict is ended, however, it cannot be dismissed from our awareness . 
It cannot be brushed aside in favor of more pleasant or tractable subjects. 
It cannot be relegated by indifference to the inconsequential . 
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Viet Nam is, as I have stated, at the core of the concerns 
and hopes of the people of the nation. It involves, in a very pertinent 
sense, the well-being of every living American and the future of the 
United States. It is interlaced with the interests of this nation in 
Asia and the Pacific and throughout the world. 
The war is already a hideous human tragedy for all concerned. 
It has destroyed tens of thousands of lives and has put to the torch of 
utter devastation an incalculable quantity of useful resources. It has 
already swept away many of man's most constructive works in VietNam, 
north and south. It has brought this nation about 40,000 casualties to 
date. It has required rising expenditures of public funds, and their 
diversion from productive works. In fact, the current costs of the 
Vietnamese war are variously estimated as running between one and two 
billion dollars a month. 
Even more disturbing, the seeds of a much larger tragedy are 
obviously implanted in the Vietnamese situation. That the conflict can 
be confined to Viet Nam is far from assured. Actually, it already extends 
into Laos and there is ever-present the possibility of its eruption into 
a war of regional, continental or world-wide dimensions. 
The conflict in Viet Nam may end, of course, long before it 
matriculates into war with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. That 
is certainly the rational hope. Whether or not it is an attainable hope 
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is another matter . In any event, the Vietnamese conflict now, today, 
already has the capacity to shake the precarious base of civilized human 
survival. That will continue to be the case until the war begins to yield 
to rational settlement . 
Whatever else it is, therefore, the war in Viet Nam is a most 
urgent '·rarning to all nations . It flashes a danger signal with respect 
to the adequacy of the present international instruments of peace . These 
instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace in Viet 
Namj they also appear incapable of restoring peace in any prompt and 
generally acceptable fashion . 
It is high time, therefore, to note with emphasis that tne 
structure of international order which has evolved during the past twenty 
years is , to say the least, dangerously haphazard . As it is now, each 
state has its own formula for safeguarding the security of its people . 
Each state tends to blend into that formula, in various combinations, a 
supply of unilateral military power and a participation in a variety of 
bilateral and regional defense arrangements. Each nation adds to this 
mixture its own version of traditional diplomacy and modern variations 
thereon . Almost all nations complete the blend with a dash of the United 
Nations . 
Of late, the role of the United Nations has become less and 
less pronounced . Indeed, with respect to VietNam the U. N. presence 
is scarcely discernibl e . It is true that the distinguished Secretary-General, 
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U Thant, has taken public note of the conflict in Viet Nam and its dangers 
to the world. The Secretary-General is a man of peace and an exceptional 
diplomat. He has made clear that he is more than willing to place his 
dedication and his skills at the disposal of the disputants in Viet Nam. 
------In his diplomatic role, he has outlined views which might provide at some 
point a basis for a settlement of the conflict and he has, otherwise, 
sought tactfully to engage the interest of various parties in a settlement. 
With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the 
Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this 
situation the potentials of the United Nations. Viet Nam is, clearly, a 
breakdown in the peace within the meaning of the Charter. It contains, 
clearly, the threat of an expanding war. With these characteristics, it 
would appear that the conflict should long since have triggered the 
utilization of every resource of the United Nations in an effort to restore 
peace. Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the 
Secretary-General, the U. N. reaction to Viet Nam has had something of the 
character of that of a disinterested, enervated or impotent on-looker. It 
is almost as though the conflict in Viet Nam were taking place not on the 
other side of this planet but rather on some other planet entirely. 
It may be, of course, that the u. N. is unable to make a contribu-
tion to peace in Viet Nam. It may also be, however, that the failure to 
seek a contribution from the U. N. is a missing link in the restoration of 
peace in Viet Nam. 
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Whatever may be involved, the non-role of the United Nations in 
this situation ought not to go unnoticed. ~n embarrassed silence is no 
longer a sufficient response to the nation 1 s needs or to tr.e world 1 s needs . 
Urgent though it is, there is mo~e involved in these needs even th n ending 
the wur in Viet Nam. There is also at stake the prevention of a more monstro s 
conflict . There is also at stake the continued credibility and utility of 
what has heretofore been a fundamental instrument in the structure of world order . 
In my judgment, it is high time to face up to the conspicuous 
absence of the U.N. from the Vietnamese dispute . We need to ask why, when 
the need for a peace -effort is maximal, the output of the U.N. is minimal . 
And we need, at the same ti .e, to explore every possibility for the en age-
ment of the organization in the effort to bring about a teroination of the 
hostilities in Viet Nam. 
The U. N. was a~ essential element, among others, in the Korean 
cease-fire . #by, then, its inconsequence in the problem of VietNam? In 
this connection, it is manifest that there have been striking changes in 
the structure of ~he U.N. since the Korean conflict. Whatever their virtues, 
it may be that these changes inhibit the engagement of the organization 
in Viet Nam. 
The most sweeping change, of course, is that the U.P . has beco~e 
a General Assembly-oriented organization at the same ti e that the member -
ship has grown to over 120 states . It will be recalled that originally 
there were 51 united nations . Among the present members, there are, as there 
have been since the outset, states-infinitesimal and states-in@ense and, in 
between, all of the gradations . 
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There are enormous differences of significance among these states 
insofar as the practical problems of maintaining peace are concerned. Yet, 
all 120 have equal access to available time in the General Assembly. All 120 
have an equal share in the control of the purse. All 120 have an equal vote 
in decisions of the Assembly. 
It is hardly an overstatement to note that the structure of the 
General Assembly is appallingly cumbersome. Nevertheless, the Assembly has 
made and it can continue to make important contributions of a long-range and 
peripheral nature to the strengthening of world peace. With all due respect, 
however, there is doubt that a body constituted as the General Assembly now 
is can play a significant--an executive--role in dealing with imminent threats 
of war or in the re-establishment of a peace that has broken down. In my 
judgment, the General Assembly is not competent for that purpose. In my 
judgment, it is delusive, at this time, to expect it to discharge functions 
of a kind which might be helpful in Viet Nam. 
It is conceivable that alterations in the structure of t he General 
Assembly might remedy its inadequacies for peace-keeping or peace-restoring 
purposes. Francis Plimpton, a former U. s. representative to the U. N. was 
right, perhaps, when he suggested that the organization was in need of "family 
planning." It might be that the use of a single spokesman for groups of small 
states 
states would be helpful. It might be, too, tha:t the clustering of smaller/ into 
one vote on some power-projected formula would be helpful in insuring fiscal 
responsibility and a measure of realism in the significant political decisions 
of that body. I have no doubt that there are any number of technical changes 
which, given sufficient time, can be absorbed to great advantage i nto the 
structure of the General Assembly. 
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But in all frankness, I must say that insofar as Viet Nam is con-
cerned, there is not a sufficient margin of time . Moreover, it is not at all 
certain that the kind of wholesale reconstitution of the General Assembly 
which 1-TOuld give it a peace-keeping function in Viet Nam and similar situations 
is either practical or desirable. As I have already noted, the General Assembly 
has other useful, long-range and peripheral functions of peace . Its value for 
those purposes should not be jeopardized by projecting it into situations for 
which it ifas not designed and for which it would ha e to be severely reshaped 
if it is to be effective . 
It seems to Tie practical, therefore, to look elsewhere in the U. 
structure for a significant contribution to the restoration of peace in Viet 
Nam . The Charter clearly indicates that, veto or not, we should look first 
to the Security Council . It may be valid to assume that the Security Council 
is less useful as an instrument of peace-keeping If en permanent powers are in 
disagreement . But it is not at all valid to assume that the uecurity Council 
is useless in those circumstances . That the Security Council may not be able 
to play the central role in questionsof peace does not rule out its playing 
of any role . 
Hhatever differences may separate them vrit respect to Viet Nam, 
the permanent powers of tne Security Council, I believe, have all expressed 
their grave concern vith the situation and the urgent need to do something 
about it . That is an entirely adequate basis, it seems to me, on which to 
turn to the Council and seek from it a contribution to the restoration of 
peace in Viet Nam . 
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Let me make clear that miracles are not to be expected. All that 
can reasonably be asked is a wholehearted effort to do what can be done to 
further peace. The least that should be expected, or accepted, it seems to 
me, is a 1·rillingness on the part of the Council to confront the issue of Viet 
Nam and to confront it soon . 
One cannot foresee, of course, what can be most helpfully done by 
the u. N. What ought to be clear at this point, however, is that doing noth-
ing in the U. N. has not helped in VietNam. There are discernible lines of 
possible U. N. contribution which, it -vrould seem, warrant 
exploration. 
•llliil-lr the fullest 
One of these lines, for example, leads from the Security Council to 
the International Court. All of the combatants in Viet Nam have affirmed, I 
believe, the fundamental relevance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as the basis 
for settlement of the conflict. Certainly, the United States has done so. 
We need to know, authdt'itatively and impartially, vhat the require-
ments may be in current circumstances for the reassertion of the Geneva Accords 
as a legal basis for a restoration of peace. We need to know, too, what must 
be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in 
the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish 
conditions for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, 
it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the 
International Court on these questions. 
It would seem to me, too, that the Security Council is an appropriate 
setting for a cards on-the-table consideration of the present positions of all 
the participants--direct or indirect--and those deeply interested in the con-
flict in Viet Nam. Certain of the states such as the United States, the 
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Soviet Union and France are present as permanent members of the Council . 
The problem of participation of the others is not insurmountable in the 
light of the experiences in the Korean case . In that irntance, it will be 
recalled, an invitation was issued to Peking--a non-member of the U.N. --to 
come to the Security Council and Peking did present its case and participate 
briefly in its discussions . 
If a consideration of the question of Viet Nam before the Security 
Council is to have maximum utility, there needs to be present not only the 
Soviet Union, France, the United States and other Security Council members 
but also China and North Viet Nam and the I ational Liberation Front, as well 
as Saigon. In a confrontation of this kind, we may begin, at last, to under-
stand whether it is distrust, disinclination, disdain, density, or whatever 
which has so far stood in ihe vray of negotiations for an honorable settlement . 
We may begin, at last, to measure rather than guess the gap which must be 
bridged in the restoration of peace in Viet am . 
To be sure, the prospects of a refusal of the invitation are obvious . 
To be sure, the prospects of a high decible of propaganda and invective, if 
the invitations are accepted, are equally obvious . But these are risks which 
can readil y be sustained when the stakes for all concerned are as high as 
they are in Viet Nam. Insofar as the United States is concerned, it is in the 
interest of this nation to welcome the confrontation . The open bar of forld 
opinion is one before which vre must never hesitate or fear to place this 
nation ' s policies . 
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The courses which I have indicated are illustrative of the possibili-
ties of using the untapped resources of the United Nations to advance tmrards 
peace in Viet Nam. They may or may not be relevant at this time. A vigorous 
effort on the part of the u. N. may prove as futile as all other efforts to 
date, military and non-military, to terminate the conflict . But with the 
world enmeshed in the most dangerous international situation since Korea, we 
must seek by every avenue to facilitate the restoration of a just peace in 
Viet Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people of that nation, to ourselves 
and to the 'mr ld • 
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PRESS RELEASE 
December 27, 1966 
Honorable Clinton P. Anderson 
Chairns.n, Ccmnittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
MAIN FILE COPY 
DO NOT REMOVE 
The gree.t volume of legislation which has been enacted during the 
past few years has set in motion new federal programs which have been designed 
to corr sJX>nd to the nation's changing needs. There canes to mind , for ex-
ample, such measures as medical car for the aged, expanded health research, 
programs for curbing water and ir pollution and for safeguarding the natural 
heritage of' America, the effort to insure equality of treatment of' all citizens, 
the acts which seek to deal with urban blight and unrest and the decay of vast 
rural areas and the many programs for the improvement of education . 
So much basic legislation was enacted in the 88th and 89th Congresses 
that I do not anticipate requests for sweeping new legislative approaches in 
the ~th Congress. That is not to say that all that confronts us in the session 
ahead. will be the need to pass appropriation bills and then adjourn . It occurs 
to me that the next Congress will also see the convergence of' a unique oppor-
tunity with a great n ed for a concentrated Senate exercise of the oversight 
function . 
I would hope to see, in the first session of' the 90th Congress, the 
beginning of' a major re-examination of what we have done in legislation during 
the past few years. Considering the vast scope of' this work and the unprece-
dented nature of much of it, it is to be expected th t there exists a number 
of rough edges , over-extensions and overlaps and, perhaps, even significant 
gaps . A thorough and dispassionate re-study of' this legislation, therefore, 
could lead to desirable refinements. 
What applies to programs which w have set in motion in recent years, 
in my judgment, applies with equal emphasis to those of' older vintage . There 
come to mind, in this connection, legislation on the military draft, agricul-
tural subsidies of one kind or another, foreign aid, income and other taxes 
and Jl8ny others . Few if any of these older legislative structures have had a 
thorough-going, second·look for many years . These, too, it seems to me , might 
profitably be subject to canplete re-study by the Senate . That kind of study 
could provide not only a basis for adjustments of legislation, as necessary, 
to the current needs of the nation but also a check on the equity and efficacy 
of the administrative interpretations and practices which have developed . 
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In short, what is suggested is t.hat th Carmittee Chairmen consult 
with the bers of their c itt s to determine with respect to matters 
within th ir camnittee jurisdiction what, in th ir judaJnent, might be most 
usefully ubjected thorough oing over ight at this time. To put 1 t 
another WO¥, I am s sting t.hat c itt initiate on behalf' of the Senate 
a cone ntrated re-exemination of or 1 islative structure by which the 
federal govenwent is e bled to pl~ 1 t role in th current life and affairs 
of the na"ion and th world. I do not anticipate much more than a b inning 
uring the caning s s ion. t the tim s to me to b v ry ripe for such 
a b inning. 
With all be t wishes for the caning year e.nd per ona.1. regards, 
I 
Sincerely yours, 
/s/ Mike Mansfield 
same letter sent to Committee Chairman: 
Senator Clinton P. Anderson Senator James 0 . Eastland 
Senator Allen J. Ellender Senator Lister Hill 
Senator Carl Hayden Senator A. S. Mike Monroney 
Senator Richard B. Russell Senator Jennings Randolph 
Senator John J. Sparlonan Senator B. Everett Jordan 
Senator Warren G. Magnuson Senator John 0. Pastore 
Senator Alan Bible 
Senator Russell B. Long 
Senator J. W. Fulbright 
Senator John L. McClellan 
Senator Henry M. Jackson 
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